Showing posts with label Newspaper Articles. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Newspaper Articles. Show all posts

Saturday, 3 September 2016


How ‘dark matter’ influences inflation

BUSINESS

Updated: August 29, 2016 11:53 IST
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Urjit Patel.
Urjit Patel.

All eyes will be on Urjit Patel, who has been appointed RBI Governor, and his every action will come under scrutiny.

With the government naming the new Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor, there is a lot of interest in what it means for monetary policy and specifically interest rates going forward. Will it mean continuity or a departure from the path charted by Dr. Raghuram Rajan? What should the Governor focus on both in the short-run and in the long-run?
Even before taking office, I believe Dr. Urjit Patel has won half the battle in making a successful transition. For this, I congratulate mostly the Government. Let me explain.
Ignorance, inflation

While a lot of ink is spent on talking about the factors that affect inflation such as oil prices, monsoon, Government spending, global demand and interest rates, often missing in these discussions is how much we don’t know about what determines inflation.
I want to call this ignorance, “dark matter” or “expectations about the future”. Inflation is an aggregation of individual prices for goods and services. When traders set these prices, they do so based on their expectations about the future demand and supply conditions, including that for money. Where do these expectations come from? Nobody knows. Even in developed countries, where regulators are supposed to know more about how the economy works, central bankers are currently fighting a losing battle with inflation. In India, Dr. Rajan developed a reputation for being a hawk with regard to inflation. I cannot but believe that such a reputation played a role in affecting people’s expectations. Now that Dr. Patel is viewed as someone cast in the same mould, the foot that the RBI has on the throat of high inflationary expectation is not going to relent and this is half the battle won.
The next arena where Dr. Patel’s performance will be judged is the foreign exchange market. That market is facing the prospect of both an imminent increase in U.S. interest rates and the redemption of about $20 billion of FCNR deposits. In this area, the best the RBI can do is have a war chest and be willing to use it to tamp down volatility. The outgoing Governor (and Dr. Patel) have talked about the ripple effects of a Fed rate increase on emerging markets. Unfortunately, there is nothing else they can do. India is too small a trading partner for the U.S., to take the externality into account in setting interest rates. Given how anticipated these events are, I believe that the RBI has plans in place to deal with any possible volatility in the currency market. The third area that has attracted the attention of both monetary authorities and commentators is the speed of monetary transmission. There is widespread criticism that the banks are not passing on the rate cuts to the borrowers. The question is what to do about this. Here, not only do I disagree with what the RBI has done, but I also strongly believe that the RBI has worsened the situation.
In its efforts to speed up the transmission of monetary policy, the RBI has pursued an aggressive policy of prescribing how banks should determine their prime lending rates. Banks have been told to rely on their marginal – instead of average – cost of funds to set their lending rates. This is a misguided intervention and is taking the country backward in its march towards a market-based economy. The regulator – whose primary responsibility is to manage the risk in the banking system – should not have any role in specifying how banks set their lending rate. That should be left to the discretion of self-interested banks. If Adam Smith’s invisible hand is not let to do its work here, I am hard pressed to think where else it will be given a free rein!
Poor timing

Second, through the arbitrarily imposed deadline of April 2017 for banks to clean up their balance sheets, the RBI has worsened banks’ ability to pass on the lower interest rates to the borrowers. While no one argues with the need for banks to clean up their balance sheets, one can definitely quibble about the timing. Ideally, cleaning up of bank balance sheets should coincide with rising asset prices and equity infusion from the main shareholder, in this case the Government. This will enable banks to continue lending even when making large provisions. At the height of the financial crisis in the U.S., the federal reserve allowed banks a moratorium on marking some of their distressed assets to market because of the recognition that it would result in the banks booking significant losses, which in turn would erode their equity and their ability to lend to aid recovery. The RBI’s deadline of April 2017 for banks to clean up their balance sheets is arbitrary. Monetary transmission will be impeded if banks are forced to record NPAs without equity infusion from the Government.
For those interested in research in finance and economics, India offers an attractive laboratory because Indian regulators are among the most active. They keep tinkering with the rules constantly and this affords a number of “natural experiments” for researchers. At the cost of hurting myself, I think what India needs are humble regulators who realise that the economy is over-regulated, command-and-control is not the way forward and that it is imperative to do less and stay in the background.
The author is Associate Professor of Finance, Olin Business School, Washington University, St. Louis.

Wednesday, 31 August 2016

Do we need a minimum wage law?


OPINION » COMMENT

Updated: September 1, 2016 00:19 IST

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“Even in post-liberalisation India, no industry lobby can openly argue that contract workers should be paid less than permanent workers for the same work.” Picture shows members of major trade unions protesting against anti-labour policies, in New Delhi, in 2011. — File photo: Ramesh Sharma
THE HINDU
“Even in post-liberalisation India, no industry lobby can openly argue that contract workers should be paid less than permanent workers for the same work.” Picture shows members of major trade unions protesting against anti-labour policies, in New Delhi, in 2011. — File photo: Ramesh Sharma

The number crunching over an appropriate minimum wage belies the fact that the state and industry only pay lip service to it

In April this year, Union Labour Minister Bandaru Dattatreya announced that thegovernment will raise the minimum wage for contract workers to Rs.10,000 per month. It would do so, he said, through an executive order. The executive order never came. What did, however, were news reports on industry’s opposition to the proposal. In July, the proposal had been shelved.
This week, in a bid to get trade unions to call off their All India strike on September 2, the governmentagain announced a hike in minimum wages, but only for unskilled non-agricultural workers, from Rs.246 to Rs.350 per day, or Rs.9,100 per month. The central trade unions, barring the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-affiliated Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS), have dismissed the hike as meaningless and announced that they will proceed with the strike.
This chain of events raises many questions: What is an appropriate minimum wage? How does one arrive at it? Does India still need something like a minimum wage?
Many reasons have been adduced for scrapping the minimum wage. The most important one is the doxa of liberalisation, which dictates that the market and not the government should determine prices so as to preserve efficiency and competitiveness. This was the objection raised by industry and heeded by the government.
The second reason to scrap the minimum wage, especially now, is that it contradicts the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government’s flagship ‘Make in India’ initiative. For foreign capital to make in India, Indian labour has to remain cheaper than Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Bangladeshi labour.
Third is a logic that is popular among economic reformers: scrap it if it’s not working. Neither industry bodies nor the state nor unions can claim that the Minimum Wages Act (MWA) is seriously implemented. India anyway has still not ratified the United Nations’ Convention No. 131 (adopted in 1970) on Minimum Wage Fixing. So why not scrap the MWA?
Why have a minimum wage?
MWA is one of the first laws of independent India, legislated in 1948, even before we had a Constitution in place. Why was it enacted?
The real motive was to buy peace on behalf of a national bourgeoisie that had to manage a working class that was far more militant in those days. But there were other reasons as well. India was a poor country with a major surplus of labour. There were too many jobs where labour did not have the bargaining power to demand a wage sufficient to survive on. Conditions where employers get away with paying workers too little generate several social costs, such as poverty, malnutrition, endemic debt leading to bonded labour, and child labour, which could be avoided through fair wages.
Three levels

The Tripartite Committee on Fair Wages, appointed in 1948, defined three different levels of wages: a living wage, a fair wage, and a minimum wage. Living wage is what a human being needs to get the basic essentials of food, shelter, clothing, protection against ill-health, security for old age, etc. A fair wage is lower than the living wage and takes into account efficiency, from the employer’s perspective. Minimum wage is similar to the fair wage except in two respects: it is even lower, and has a statutory dimension. Today, there is broad consensus among patriotic businessmen and nationalist policymakers that mandating a living wage or even a fair wage for Indian workers is a ridiculous idea not worth discussing. What’s left on the table is the minimum wage. How much should it be?
The resolution passed at the 15th Indian Labour Conference in 1957 mandates taking into account five factors for calculating the minimum wage: 1. The wage must support three consumption units (individuals); 2. Food requirement of 2,700 calories a day; 3. Clothing requirement of 72 yards per worker’s family; 4. Rent for housing area similar to that provided under the subsidised housing scheme; 5. Fuel, lighting and miscellaneous items of expenditure to constitute 20 per cent of the minimum wage. In 1991, the Supreme Court called for adding another 25 per cent to the wage yielded by the above calculation in order to take into account children’s education, medical requirements, etc.
If calculated using these parameters, some estimates put the minimum wage at Rs.26,000 per month. This is the amount Central government employee unions are demanding from the Seventh Pay Commission, which had fixed their minimum wage at Rs.18,000.
Minimum wage via pay parity

But figures such as Rs.26,000 or even the Rs.10,000 mooted by the Labour Ministry sound fantastical in comparison to the official minimum wage in some parts of India, which can dip as low as Rs.1,650 a month (Puducherry, agriculture, 2013). Typically, the actual minimum wage is close to or less than Rs.4,800, currently the National Floor Level Minimum Wage.
Ironically enough, despite the MWA not being taken seriously by anyone, even a pro-reform government such as the one in power dare not speak of scrapping it, preferring instead to undermine it.
As A.K. Padmanabhan of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) puts it, “If a government is serious about ensuring that contract workers get better wages, it would amend the Minimum Wages Act to stipulate that permanent and contract workers get the same pay for same work. But this government has not touched the Act.”
Even in post-liberalisation India, no industry lobby can openly argue that contract workers should be paid less than permanent workers for the same work. The NDA government has a brute majority in the Lok Sabha. No party in the Rajya Sabha will oppose an amendment mandating pay parity between permanent and contract workers. So, if there is one ‘labour reform’ that can be said to have universal consensus as well as logic on its side, it is this simple amendment. In one stroke, it would raise the minimum wage of contract workers by bringing it on a par with permanent worker wages, and encourage their regularisation. But neither the United Progressive Alliance in its time nor the NDA now is interested in passing such an amendment. It is not hard to fathom why, or who benefits from this pay differential.
sampath.g@thehindu.co.in

Tuesday, 23 August 2016

Understanding inflation targeting

OPINION » LEAD

Updated: December 8, 2014 01:27 IST
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Inflation targeting re-emphasises the primacy of price stability as the objective of monetary policy. Given the rigidities in the economy and lags in policy impact, it must be operated with flexibility

Inflation targeting is back in the news and this is welcome. I have always held the view that the dominant objective of monetary policy is the maintenance of price stability. Inflation targeting gives precision to the concept of price stability.
In any monetary policy framework, a key ingredient is an enunciation of its objectives. This aspect has assumed increased significance in the context of the stress being laid on the autonomy of central banks. Autonomy goes with accountability, and accountability in turn requires a clear statement of goals.
The case of price stability as the major objective of economic policy rests on the assumption that volatility in prices creates uncertainties in decision-making. Rising prices adversely affect savings while making speculative investments more attractive. These apart, there is a crucial social dimension, particularly in developing countries. Inflation adversely affects those who have no hedges against it, and this includes all poorer sections of the community. This is indeed a very strong argument in favour of the maintenance of price stability in emerging economies.
Apart from monetary policy, regulation of the financial system, particularly the banking system, is entrusted to central banks in most countries. There has to be close coordination between these two functions.
Price stability and growth

A crucial question that arises in this context is whether the pursuit of the objective of price stability by monetary authorities undermines the ability of the economy to attain other objectives such as growth. In short, the question is whether there is a trade-off between inflation and growth. There is a general consensus that over the medium and the long term, there is no such trade-off and an environment of low inflation is most conducive to faster economic growth. However, there could be such a possibility in the short term. By injecting greater demand and thereby generating higher inflation, higher growth may be achieved. However, to sustain this growth, the authorities may have to generate higher and higher inflation. This will end up as a self-defeating exercise.
What then is the tolerable level of inflation? At very low levels of inflation, there may not be any adverse consequences on the economy. However, in every economy, given its structure, there is always a certain level of inflation beyond which costs of inflation begin to rise steeply. It is this inflation threshold which can provide guidance to policymakers. Interestingly, the Chakravarty Committee, of which I was a member, regarded the acceptable rise in prices as 4 per cent. Several studies in the Indian context have estimated that the threshold level of inflation may be around 6 per cent.
Other objectives

Questions have been raised about the robustness of such models. Even large econometric models are not in a position to capture all the costs of inflation. This order of inflation is however higher than what developed countries normally aim for. This will have some implications for the exchange rate of the currency and Current Account Deficit. In the Indian context, it is best to work towards an average of 4 per cent and take strong action if it touches 6 per cent. This will amount to inflation targeting with a band, as recommended by the Urjit Patel Committee. Such a commitment will also dampen inflation expectations.
Does the focus on inflation targeting by monetary authorities mean a neglect of other objectives such as growth and financial stability? Hardly so. What inflation targeting demands is that when inflation exceeds the threshold level, the primary focus of monetary policy must be to bring it back to the desired level. It is sometimes claimed that the financial crisis of 2008 in the United States and western Europe sounded the death knell for inflation targeting. There is continuing debate on whether the crisis was precipitated by monetary policy failure or regulatory failure. Countries like Canada and Australia, which were committed to inflation targeting, were not caught in the crisis.
Central banks have multiple functions. Apart from monetary policy, regulation of the financial system, particularly the banking system, is entrusted to central banks in most countries. There has to be close coordination between these two functions. For the crisis itself, regulatory lapses have to take major responsibility while monetary policy in these countries might at best have played a facilitating role. The low interest rate regime which prevailed because of low inflation could have created an environment favourable for high risk-taking. A rise in asset prices should have alerted the monetary authorities and they should have taken appropriate action. Inflation targeting does not preclude other objectives from the purview of monetary authorities so long as inflation remains within the comfort zone. The control of inflation becomes its exclusive concern only when inflation crosses the acceptable level.
Can it be done?

Can the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) or for that matter any central bank effectively implement an inflation mandate? Do they have enough instruments to achieve the goal? The ability of the central banks to control inflation when such inflation stems from excess demand is normally conceded. It is when inflation is triggered by supply shocks that some doubts are raised. Such supply shocks are most common in countries like India where agricultural production is subject to the vagaries of nature. Even when inflation is triggered by food inflation, monetary policy and fiscal policy have a role to play. If food inflation lasts long, it gets generalised. Wages rise leading to a general cost push inflation. If head line inflation exceeds the acceptable level, monetary policy must act at least to ensure that the return on financial assets is positive in real terms. In a situation of supply shocks, it may take longer for monetary policy to bring down inflation. The recent experience with inflation in our country is a good example of this. That is why the inflation mandate must provide for a range and a time frame for adjustment which should not be too short. Nevertheless, monetary policy must act irrespective of what triggered inflation. Obviously, supply side management is needed in situations of supply stock and that should be the responsibility of the government.
Institutional framework

The appropriate institutional framework for implementing the inflation mandate also raises certain questions. The first issue is on who should determine the acceptable level of inflation. In most countries which have adopted inflation targeting, the target is set by the government or Parliament. This appears to be appropriate in as much as the acceptable level of inflation is not purely an economic issue. However, once a mandate is prescribed by the government or Parliament, the monetary authority should be left with full autonomy to use whatever instruments that are available to it to implement the mandate.
The second issue relates to an appropriate price index which should be used to monitor inflation. In India, we have monitored inflation by mostly looking at the wholesale price index. That was because of the easy availability of this index. Until recently, we have had no composite retail price index. Since the objective of inflation targeting is to minimise the impact of price rise on people, the appropriate index will be retail inflation.
The third issue relates to institutional arrangements within the monetary authority to take policy decisions consistent with an inflation mandate. In several countries, a technical monetary policy committee is constituted with members drawn from the central bank, from the government and from outside experts. My preference would be to constitute a committee of the board of the RBI to do this. This is what was done when the Board for Financial Supervision was set up. While constituting the central board of the RBI, this aspect of the work of the bank must also be kept in view.
Inflation targeting re-emphasises the primacy of price stability as the objective of monetary policy. Given the rigidities in the economy and the lags in policy impact, it must be operated with flexibility.
(Dr. C. Rangarajan is former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.)